Bunker Mulligan "Let us endeavor so to live that when we come to die even the undertaker will be sorry." ~Mark Twain

I picked out an article from Early Bird this morning that was written by Richard Whittle for The Dallas Morning News this weekend. DMN requires registration, and I couldn’t find this particular article on their site (perhaps it will be up later today).

Donald Rumsfeld’s relations with the military are the worst of any defense secretary since Robert McNamara’s during the Vietnam War.

So say Mr. Rumsfeld’s critics.

Donald Rumsfeld is wildly popular with the military, who revel in his aggressive, combative style and appreciate his determination to transform the armed forces for the 21st Century.

So say his defenders.

Two of Rumsfeld’s detractors are retired Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni and former Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki. Two gentlemen who served their country well and admirably. Both highly qualified warriors. Yet they have issues with Rumsfeld.

I had issues with bosses in the military. I had some heated arguments with superiors. I also had credibility, and they listened to what I had to say whether they agreed or not. Me too. I think that is something most civilians don’t understand about the military. Dissent is considered to be good. It keeps everyone on their toes. But dissent is also expected to be coherent and offer solutions. Chronic complainers don’t survive. Shinseki and Zinni aren’t chronic complainers, else they never would have achieved stars on their collars. And they are both professionals who aired their grievances publicly only after leaving the military. You can bet they aired them in private before that, and voiced that disagreement face-to-face with whomever they disagreed with.

It is definitely time to reassess our military structure, and that is precisely what Rumsfeld is trying to do. Unfortunately, there is a bureaucracy in the Pentagon for which inertia is the standard. Face it, every bureaucracy has it, and it makes people comfortable. In particular, the Army likes large formations of heavy weaponry. It is how the Army had been structured since its inception. The Navy has had to change from battleships to carriers to…? Don’t even think of taking away their carriers. The Air Force has always loved bigger and faster aircraft, preferring bombers over all, although the focus has become bigger fighters that fly very fast but carry big bomb loads. And the Marines want nothing to do with administrative and logistics functions except as they directly apply to boots in the sand.

The National Security Act of 1947 combined all the military into the Department of Defense and created a Department of the Air Force to match those of the Army and Navy. It was considered radical, and the original intent was to create a single military organization combining all the services. But the same inertia was at work in 1947 that is in place today. The Army and Navy didn’t go away, they were simply joined by yet another entity under the umbrella of Defense. And the cooperative effort that won the war went away in the push for budget dollars. Cross-service training fell by the wayside until it became obvious to all it was essential–at Desert One.

Each service has its own particular expertise, but they must be merged much better. The Navy and Marines do this well, as do all the special operations units. And that needs to be the template for the future. We have need for heavy units, as the invasion of Iraq showed. But their utility is limited, as the occupation of Iraq has shown. There is some difficulty in breaking down a heavy unit into smaller groups for this type of operation as they have trained to do otherwise. They are accustomed to supporting one another rather than operating independently. That doesn’t mean young officers and NCOs don’t adapt. That creativity has always been the hallmark of American soldiers. But it is difficult to adapt a bigger mentality.

And that is the rub. People complain that we don’t have enough troops in Iraq, but they offer no solution. How would more troops be used? What is the ratio of shooters to supporters? Perhaps we have the wrong troops in place. Light, fast, responsive forces are required. We have few of those, and they have been on constant rotation to both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rumsfeld wants more of these forces, and what I would term as traditionalists like the structure as it now exists. Others want to see change. From what I see, that is where the dividing line exists. I don’t think we can eliminate heavy forces, but their utility in this type warfare is limited. If there is to be any expansion, it needs to be in the small unit area with a focus on light units. And that includes the Air Force and Navy. That makes me a Rumsfeld supporter.

Traditionalists would like to see Rumsfeld gone. They have their chance in November.