Bunker Mulligan "Let us endeavor so to live that when we come to die even the undertaker will be sorry." ~Mark Twain

The 9/11 commission issues I brought up led me to contemplate all the hoo-hah about the failure of our intelligence services to accurately account for WMD in Iraq. The issues are the same, and may lead to greater failures–and deaths.

Intelligence is not an exact science. Analysts can seldom say anything with absolute certainty. And to demand that they do so is insane. Yet, if at any time there was an opportunity to say with complete certainty that gathered intelligence was correct, it was in the evaluation that Saddam Hussein had WMD. The conclusion was inescapable. Everyone in the world knew, for a fact, that he had them and used them. Every piece of information coming out of Iraq to the various intelligence services said he was working on delivery systems and nuclear weapons. And, in spite of what you’ll hear on television newscasts, Iraqi agents were in Africa trying to obtain nuclear material. And Saddam had some interest in that aspirin factory in Sudan as well.

So, do we gut the entire intelligence system because they drew the wrong conclusion from information everyone deemed fact? Was the conclusion really wrong, or was it justified based on the information available?

The headhunting called for by many is unjustified. Not only that, it is absolutely counter-productive. Intelligence is a nebulous world. Every piece of information is suspect because it is obtained through people with many conflicting interests, the primary one being to protect their own lives. If you punish someone who said, emphatically, that Saddam had WMD, how will you ever get an analyst to draw a solid conclusion ever again? And wishy-washy analysis gets people killed.

UPDATE: Kenneth M. Pollack writes an article for Atlantic Monthly describing the causes of bad intel in the case of WMD in Iraq. He served in the Clinton White House, and considered invading Iraq essential…eventually. I think he makes much of this clearer, although he does get bogged down in “rush to war” and other such statements.

Doesn’t it strike anyone else as prevaricating that we would have to oust Saddam “eventually”? What would be the benefit of waiting?

Build alliances? That was never going to happen because Russia and France were making too much money to ever join in (as he admits).

Build up our military to make the task easier? The Administration was on a manpower trimming expedition. The Federal Government manpower numbers declined during the Clinton Administration. Every department except one added personnel: Defense.

If war with Saddam was inevitable, in his estimation, why would any action be a rush to war? How many innocents needed to die before it would be okay? Or did they not matter?

In my mind, this article only makes me wonder why we waited so long.