Bunker Mulligan "Let us endeavor so to live that when we come to die even the undertaker will be sorry." ~Mark Twain

Any time Bogey and I have discussions, I end up thinking about what we’ve said afterwards. Last night, after several emails back and forth (with Birdie putting a word or two in, and he’s actually learning to use the shift key now), I thought about the concept of strategy versus the standard word used today: plan.

It is a common belief in this country that an administration’s strategy for dealing with other countries should be an open discussion. In particular, the press like to have all information. Their belief is that they can synthesize it all for public consumption. But international relationships are really quite complex, and have many layers, some overt, some covert. Unless you are deep within the process, it is difficult to grasp all that is happening.

There is a call from some for Bush to openly discuss what his “plans” are for the future regarding international affairs. I am sure there are many in his administration who would love to tell all. Opening things up would dispel rumors, and make life easier for some. But that would make things very difficult for others. And it would jeopardize many ongoing concerns.

One example may suffice. Saddam Hussein worked relationships through bravado, money, and threats. He determined that the best way to handle things was through secrecy rather than openness. Sometimes that is the way to go, but this time it cost him his position. He played the game expecting to be able to drag things out as he had successfully done for years. He alone determined what would be open and what would be closed. This was his strategy for dealing with the UN and US. It failed because he kept the wrong things secret–things which could have saved his regime.

Our own strategy in prosecuting what has become known as the Bush Doctrine, is secret. It must be. Certain elements of this strategy will be made public, some already have been. But others will remain known to a select few in the Administration. For everything to be open would be to compromise some of the more covert workings. In addition, keeping aspects hidden can also be a tool in itself. Perhaps Qadaffi was being told, by some third party, that he was on a secret target list. Maybe he was, and maybe he wasn’t. But that uncertainty wasn’t something he was willing to deal with. Saddam was being told, in the open, that he was definitely a target. He didn’t believe it.

Using secrecy as a tool is dangerous, as Saddam found out. It is just as dangerous for the US. It is also important. There must be a balance, and there must be good intelligence. Qadaffi could have easily launched some kind of attack in preemption. We must have had some rational belief he wouldn’t if, in fact, we had pressed someone to “tip him off.”

I can imagine many routes for the Administration to follow in their goal toward more representative governments in the world. So far, I have been correct in my assessment, although not 100%. And, some things have not happend (yet?) which I expected. I’ll give my analysis, and hope that whatever direction things go, the final achievement will be a world filled with people having control of their own governments.

Syria and Iran are the two most pressing issues. Both will be pressured in many ways. Syria has occupied Lebanon for twenty years, and things are beginning to heat up a bit there. Lebanese want Syrian troops out of their country. Bush will do what he can to provide support by pressing Assad militarily from the east, and socially and diplomatically from the west. Israel may lend assistance covertly, or with strikes in the Golan Heights area.

Iran will be pressured from the west with military presence on their border with Iraq and the implementation of a secular Muslim government this summer. At the same time, more US troops will be operating in Afghanistan. The US will provide support in covert ways to dissidents in Iran.

The hope is that both autocracies will fail under their own weight. Once that happens, Saudi Arabia is isolated, and so is Yasser Arafat. Both will have to change or be replaced. James spent some time on this issue. The Hashemites, who currently rule Jordan, would like very much to see the Sauds gone.

For our part, any desire for specific changes and the mechanism for those changes must remain secret. To openly profess a determination to see the Sauds or Assads of this world gone could actually work against that end.

Korea is yet another problem which people want to group into the issues in the Middle East. Bush did this himself, and I think he now regrets it in some way. Not that he was wrong, but that divulging of this secret didn’t get the results he hoped for. Now, we must depend on others to make the changes. China, Japan, and South Korea all have special interest in seeing Kim Jung Il gone from the scene. And they would like to see him depart in a way that minimizes conflict on the peninsula. Minimize is my word of choice because I believe what many in the military have over the years: We do not station troops there to keep the North out of the South, but to keep the South from trying to move into the North. Both sides want unification. If Kim were to step down, go into exile, or be killed, some form of conflict will erupt. It may be isolated, and that, I think, is the best we could hope for.

If Kim remains, he will be the joker in the deck. I doubt anyone can predict his actions (his own strategy, perhaps), and having custody of nuclear weapons means he can cause major problems either by using them himself or passing them along to others. Bush will continue to press him through others. It is the best route to a solution. The three other main players in the area have far more at stake than do we.

The Bush Strategy will remain secret for the most part. It will become an issue as opponents, foreign and domestic, press for explanation of his “plan.” I support Bush primarily because he is taking a long-term view of the world situation rather than the easy route that counts time only in election cycles. He has already shown his willingness to take the political risks by invading both Afghanistan and Iraq. People forget how risky those decisions were as his enemies complain that he did them for political gain. It is a difficult route for a politician to follow. Yet it is one which must be followed for any true measure of success.