Bunker Mulligan "Let us endeavor so to live that when we come to die even the undertaker will be sorry." ~Mark Twain

Did you see the Marine officer in Haiti who–when asked on Sunday what he knew about the Haitian gunman who was part of the shooting into the crowd on Saturday–said, “I only know two things about him; he shot at my Marines…and he is dead.”

While I was in the military, I was known as a bit of a maverick. I seldom took things at face value, and often butted heads with people who outranked me. I also tolerated people below me who wanted to butt heads with me. I was careful not to cross the line between argument and insubordination, and made sure people around me understood the difference.

I was pretty fortunate. I had terrific bosses. They actually liked my willingness to ask the hard questions and point out bad decisions without being arrogant or demeaning.

The only boss I had problems with in this regard was a captain I worked for right after getting my commission. When I arrived at Arnold Engineering Development Center, I was a brand new second lieutenant with eleven years of service. He was a careerist, intent on becoming a general. Friction right away. But the LtCol we both worked for asked to have me assigned to his office because he wanted a crusty “old” former NCO.

The captain liked “visibility,” and was always volunteering for escort detail in order to meet visiting colonels and generals. He offered my services on occasion as well. We once had a group of colonels fly in, and the landing gear on their aircraft collapsed. When time came for them to leave, we had to drive them up to the Nashville airport to catch a commercial flight. The captain decided he would drive the senior colonel (a brigadier-select), and I would shuttle the others.

We were on a tight schedule, and I told the colonels we would get there as quickly as we could, but I couldn’t guarantee they’d catch their flight. One of them said, “I know how to guarantee it, Lieutenant. If you don’t get us there on time, I’ll have your ass.”

I just said, “Go right ahead, sir. All you’ll be getting is scar tissue.” The others all laughed. They made their flight, and the colonel told me, with a smile, “I guess I won’t chew your ass after all!” The captain, when I told him about it, almost choked. “You’ve got to be careful what you say to senior officers.” I didn’t get escort duty any more.

My experience has been that senior military people tolerate, at a minimum, dissent. Their goal is to have the right information in order to make the right decisions. Where this changes is when people get to the Pentagon. There, the job is purchasing, not fighting. Civilians seem to think the Pentagon is the nerve center for all warfighting. It isn’t. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff make broad policy decisions, and the day-to-day work is handled by the various commands. The majority of people at the Pentagon are involved in personnel policy, research, budget, and acquisition.

Now, that’s a long way around to getting where I wanted to be in this post. But I felt I needed to set the stage a bit about two different military personalities: Colonel David Hackworth, and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters.

“Hack” has an impressive background. He worked his way through the ranks as a fighter and leader. He has many decorations for bravery, and has become the voice of the GI through his web site Soldiers for the Truth. He has a big following. Of interest in this post is his disciples working in the Pentagon–junior officers appalled at the way things are done there.

Peters has a completely different background. He is an intelligence analyst. His duties carried him around the globe working in the black world. His career is one of secrecy and little recognition. He became a writer and security consultant. His following is the relatively small group of professionals who read publications like Parameters. Unfortunately, this is a small group in the military.

I respect both men. Both built their careers with hard work, intelligence, and integrity. They come at issues from a different angle, and often their analyses are identical.

But sometimes they aren’t. And these are the areas where I generally fall in line behind Peters rather than Hackworth.

Hack has become almost a caricature of himself in the last year or so. He still takes on the establishment regarding soldiers’ individual equipment and the Pentagon’s love of high-priced machines which have little to offer in the way of improvements over existing stock. He also is quick to point out deficiencies in new buys and equipment research. All of which comes to him through people in the Pentagon. But he has begun to delve into the intellectual side of things regarding strategy and theory, and these are not his areas of strength. What troubles me about this excursion is that he may minimize himself in pursuit of the things he knows in trying to be all things. He is becoming arrogant and demeaning rather than simply argumentative.

Peters understands the strategy and theory side of things far better, but doesn’t impose himself in the tactical/leadership areas. Both he and Hack agree on the need to restructure the military to imrove the quick reaction capability, as this is apparent to both strategists and tacticians. But Peters focuses on what he knows best–intelligence, diplomacy, and international relations. The brushes he has with the tactical level are cursory, and used to establish perspective in the broader picture he wants to examine. Where Hackworth blasts new programs as irrelevant and too expensive, Peters explains how their implementation would sidetrack the ongoing effort to change our strategic approach. Hack speaks to the GI, and Peters speaks to the policy makers.

Until the policy makers change their thinking, GIs will continue to purchase the things they really need out of their own pockets. I wish Hack would get a clue from Peters and fight the battle more effectively. Right now, he simply pisses people off. The top folks in the Pentagon aren’t about to change just because Hack wants them to, especially if he appears to simply want to embarrass them. And there’s too much at stake not to change.

Hugh Hewitt played Bush’s speech tothe troops at Fort Campbell yesterday–twice. He bemoans the fact that Big Media fail to show much interest in the military and their relationship with their Commander in Chief. In fact, Dana Milbank says soldiers were ordered to cheer:

Before Bush appeared, small U.S. flags were handed out, and an officer gave instructions to the troops on how to receive the commander in chief. “We’re going to show him a lot of love by waving flags,” the officer said. Telling the troops not to salute, he added: “You’re going to wave and clap and make a lot of noise. . . . You must smile. We are happy campers here.”

I’ve only seen this happen once in my military career. During the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations, Jimmy Carter visited. All soldiers at Fort Clayton were ordered to attend a speech by Carter because it was quite clear not enough would show up on their own. I’ve never heard of that happening with any other President, including Bill Clinton. I can assure you that isn’t the case with George Bush. GIs will show up to hear him anywhere.

As an aside to this, I flew Mondale around the Zone when he visited before Carter. At one point he asked, “You mean we’re going to give all this to the Panamanians?”

Makes a father’s day. Yesterday my oldest boy called from Bagram. Today, the youngest called from Baghdad.

Slice, my Marine captain, is now in-country. I’ve set up a page for him with a link under “Who We Are” on the left. Birdie is still in Baghdad, and his platoon patrols the baddest neighborhood in Baghdad, home to such luminaries as Chemical Ali and Saddam’s daughter. I’ve added two photos he sent today on his page. One is the aforementioned Chemical Ali’s Palace, and the second is a shot driving through the Baathist stronghold.

They have had pretty good success in quieting this area, although they still have some confrontations. Mostly, though, the locals don’t mess with the guys with the “AA” on their left shoulder.

One way they’ve learned to deal with the youthful antagonists is to truss them up with tie-wraps and leave them lying on the ground. Instead of hauling them in, they let the elders in the area take care of discipline. He says most of them whine about being left tied up, but it’s certainly better than shooting them.

Birdie and his squad found a photo of Saddam. This is the result.

GIs haven’t changed much over the centuries. I would bet Caesar’s legionnaires did similar things. A few more new photos on Birdie’s page.

In 1992 I was teaching future Air Force officers at USAFA. Just prior to graduation, I had an ethics class with seniors about to graduate, and one of them whined, “Can we talk about something other than the Honor Code? We’ve been beat over the head with it for four years!” I had already planned to do just that, so it was a great lead-in.

We were in the beginnings of a force reduction as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union, and an end to the Cold War. Some of the cadets were concerned about their future. So, I went into an explanation of the cycles of drawdown the military has seen.

In particular, I pointed out that the peak manpower had been in the late sixties and early seventies. There was a large reduction then, which bottomed out in the early eighties. It then climbed again, and in 1992 was about to drop once more. The only thing they needed to concern themselves with was whether they would retire as a lieutenant colonel or colonel in 20 years.

Bush 41 and Cheney (then, SecDef) had an organized plan for reduction. Clinton came in, and the plan went away in favor of expediency. Some of the reductions are listed here.

The interesting thing to me is that Clinton and Gore claimed they reduced the size of government. Well, I have to admit they did. They never explained how, did they?

Every agency in the Federal Government increased in manpower during their tenure except one: The Military. Their reduction in government manpower was completely on the back of the Pentagon.

And now they want credit for the quality of the military? I guess, indirectly, they are responsible. Military people are “can-do”, and took these reductions as a challenge. They rallied and built themselves, with no help from the White House, into what we now have. Guard and Reserve units shed those who were in just for the benefits, and recruited people who believed in the mission. Remember the crying that accompanied the call-ups in the first Gulf War? You heard little of that this time around.

Mrs. Clinton can get away with saying such things because the people who cheer her and her husband have very short memories, and are obsessed with their celebrity.

No, Clinton didn’t give us this military. Military personnel built it themselves from the pieces left over after the Clinton cuts.

As I think of the cycles, I wonder if we will again be in draw-down mode in 2012. Is that when we can expect this war on terror to be done. I think that timeline is just about right…unless someone other than Bush enters the White House next January. Even then, having Hillary there in 2009 may extend this war.

This is a really smart idea. In fact, Ross Perot did this for years. He recruited people leaving the military because, as his EDS web site said, “You have proved you possess the background, integrity, and work ethic we are looking for. We will give you the job skills to go along with those qualities.” He hired people, then trained them to do the job they were to fill.

Tom Marzullo is doing what he can.